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The West Asia War: Its Perspectives & Lessons for India (part 3/3)

Lessons for India

Perspectives & Lessons

The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia have brought in friction among the key players, and the global dynamics need constant monitoring. India cannot ignore China’s collusive support to Pakistan, and its own belligerent posture along the LAC, and the ongoing Pakistani infiltration/intrusions by terrorists along the LC. The No War No Peace status could continue with no troop disengagement in sight.

A de novo look into the our strategy and doctrines has already been necessitated by the Ukraine our experience in Op Sindhoor and now by the conflict in West Asia have brought into focus the importance of AI driven decision making, integrated data from drones, satellites, and ground sensors to assess threats, the use of LLM for multi domain operations and maximum use of precision stand-off weapons, cruise missiles, loitering and decoy munitions and swarm drones. The integration of indigenous missiles like Akash Teer & Brahmos with other weapon platforms & drones in the AD umbrella must be further refined.

Maintain and strengthen alliances

India needs to adapt to changes in the unipolar world. The UN has failed because the veto powers enjoyed by the five powers have granted them unfair advantages. UN Reforms are the need of the hour. Technical Alliance with the US and Israel for strategic autonomy, import of critical minerals, and rare earths needs to be pursued with renewed vigour.

Smart Power. Our goal towards being a smart power requires a renewed focus on technology with public-private partnerships, energy & global economics. Creation of more traditional diplomatic tools for trade and security, including a separate security and intelligence organization for missions / embassies / consulates abroad, critical R&D and nuclear installations, and Infrastructure like refineries and creation of strategic petroleum reserve depots along the coastline.

Military diplomacy. This is a vital component of foreign policy that has been at the forefront of the West Asia conflict. There should be a concomitant focus on how military-to-military contacts can advance their respective governments' viewpoints / immediate objectives in a clear-cut manner for influencing decision-making. The representation / exchange programs of senior-level officers in each other’s defense staff colleges / institutions are a step in the right direction. The regional expertise acquired by our MAs abroad should provide invaluable input for defense policy makers in the MOD. All these have been tried out, but not seriously.

Budgetary Allocation. Geopolitics is fast swivelling towards high tech. An increase in defense spending from 1.9% of GDP to 2,5 % for the next five years is necessary. Separate allocation to space organization for a communication satellite, measures to reduce and deter threats to own space assets and increase resilience in space. In addition, oil & gas exploration needs bigger share in the budgetary allotment and must function directly under PMO. 

Chip Production. India has embarked on this aspect by the infusion of massive govt capital into the semiconductor industry and encouraging the banking sector to advance loans without red tape. Secondly, India needs to lure back home its scientists and engineers trained in the US who had worked in Silicon Valley to capitalize on the wealth of their experience. Also, forge partnerships with leading firms for the transfer of technology to train local workers.

Atam Nirbhar Bharat. India needs to reduce its dependency on foreign suppliers for high-value projects like Tejas Mk 2 & AMCA. Introduce Defense Acquisitions / Procurement reforms to increase capacities of all PSUs / startups on a wartime basis based on assured orders. It also needs fresh minds and domain experts/technocrats, and not bureaucrats, to execute these projects.

One of the most touted projects, the Sudarshan Chakra project, is believed to have better capabilities than the Israeli Arrow, Iron Dome, and Patriot AD shield, which is due for introduction by 2035. The private sector should also be able to reverse engineer & produce at least one lakh low-cost, Shahed variety drones and also the Ukraine interceptor Sting drone, both for own use as well as export.   

Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). The decision to use subterranean caverns equipped with a water curtain system in Andhra Pradesh & Karnataka has provided a buffer against disruptions, for the government runs an oil cache with a capacity of about 25 days of crude reserve. which is insufficient for the country. India needs at least 90 days of storage based on an average consumption of 56 lakh barrels per day.

Likewise, a portion of gas, near each regassification facility/refinery, needs to be earmarked and stored as a buffer for 90 days. A coordinated project at the national level on expanded SPR, involving the Centre & state ministries, must be taken on priority. The country’s efforts at harnessing alternative energy sources, especially new and renewable energy projects, must continue.

Protection Against Cyber Assaults & Hackers. Online functioning of news portals, govt websites, and financial, banking, & electronics banking sectors needs protection from cyber-attacks and hackers. Likewise, closure of the country’s hydroelectric power projects feeding the Northern & Eastern electricity grids could be targeted. The closure of the Internet, cracking computer codes, and increasing cyber intrusions could render most govt networks unusable and force air traffic control dysfunction. The country also needs filters to prevent flooding of messages on Twitter ( X) and FB and other social media platforms.

Improvement of Law & Order Situation in NE Border States. The law-and-order situation in NE border states like Arunachal, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur & Mizoram needs to be improved, and the enemy psywar & propaganda countered. Changes in administration, peace talks between rival factions in Manipur, relief & rehabilitation schemes, and Improvements in the quality of life, development of road communications, are ongoing processes and must continue. Monitoring of rivers flowing from China, especially in Arunachal, is important.

Strategic Imperatives. Certain outstanding issues, once resolved, which could contribute substantially to the national efforts, in the aftermath of the West Asia conflict. Questions that arise from those are:

  • Why is there a delay in the creation of three independent Theatre Commands and one Maritime Command, which has been pending for unknown reasons? The Govt must not vacillate to resolve ongoing “turf battles.”
  • Why is there a tearing hurry to develop a sixth-generation fighter when there is so much delay in fifth-generation projects like Tejas Mk IA, Tejas Mk2, and MRFA? 
  • Why can’t India declare LAC and LC as red-hot lethal frontiers in Northern and NE theatres and accord top priority to provide the best surveillance means, maximum mobility to forward troops packed with the latest weaponry, including satellite imagery, drones, and missiles, and an equally well-equipped quick reaction team to deal with intrusions, in a real battle-tested time frame?
  • Does the Indian Navy aspire to seek sea control of the Indian Ocean, which is well beyond its capabilities? It cannot afford power projection for sea control. It may, therefore, be prudent to confine ourselves to a limited scope with AA & AD in our areas of interest. First, in the Arabian Sea, to protect our shipping lanes, extending from the Indian coastline to the Gulf of Oman, then on to the Horn of Africa and southwards to Lakshadweep & Minicoy Islands & may include Maldives & Mauritius, the friendly countries. Next, in the Bay of Bengal, from the Eastern coast to the Andaman & Nicobar Islands chain up to the Malacca Straits.
  • Once this is understood, the country also needs to set red lines for China & Pak in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, on similar lines as China has set up in the South China Sea. More submarines are needed, as well as destroyers, stealth frigates, and missile boats rather than aircraft carriers.
  • India’s Naval strategy could be further refined to the domination of various red lines in the two areas, viz., the Arabian Sea & the Bay of Bengal, first, rather than the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean. The defense of 7000 km of Indian coastline, the 370 kms EEZ, our island territories and installations & ports, besides existing sea lanes and shipping, all need to be protected, which first requires a rethink. The strategy of domination & keeping the Malacca Straits open also provides excellent hiding places for hundreds of fast-moving mine-laying, suicide/tanker ramming speed boats for protecting our vital interests, strategic petroleum reserves in caverns along the coastline, and our island territories.
  • India has to make a coordinated joint defensive plan with Indonesia for the Malacca Straits, the regulation of sea traffic and their protection, troop deployment, and operational contingencies, keeping the international maritime laws in focus.
  • India has invested in good relations with Oman and must strengthen these further. The possibility of secured oil and natural gas supply via land route or through pipelines laid on a long-term basis, from the UAE, bypassing the Straits of Hormuz to the Gulf of Oman ports, is to be explored as a priority.

Sometimes the price of peace can be more than the price of war.

 

Part 1 - What brought the US to the war with Iran and how they responded

Part 2 - The effects of the conflict on the world

About the author

Brigadier Dinesh Mathur (Ret'd)

Brigadier Dinesh Mathur (Ret'd)

An alumnus of NDA Khadakvasla, was commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery in June 63. Served in 17 & 9 Parachute Field Regiment and has held prestigious command and staff / instructional appointments. Was Brigade Major in the NE 1977-79, Directing Staff in Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, and War College Mhow, and Instructor Gunnery at School of Artillery. Commanded Infantry & Artillery Brigades in Northern & Western Sectors. Retired in Dec 2000, completing over 37 1/2 years’ service. Has authored several publications on strategy and national security.

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