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FZ1073: The Perpetrator, the Al-Qaeda Links Investigated

Written by Aparna Rawal

Analytical report, status as of 5 October 2026. Open-source and unclassified. Competing claims are attributed, not adjudicated.

  1. Assessment in brief
  • It is imperative to indicate that the Al Qaeda affinity of the co pilot of Fly Dubai FZ1073 is thought documented, it is treated circumstantial based on reports. The imagery on his social media accounts appeared soon after the attack, while his archived earlier posts have shown strong religiosity but no obvious calls for violence has been established on those accounts (CNN, ABC). According to The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) sourced reporting, it states that the investigators believe he underwent indoctrination into Al Qaeda's ideology, with no person or group named as of yet. This remains yet to be revealed if proved to be true.
  • No operational link with Al Qaeda has been publicly established. A Gulf diplomat told a news agency that agencies from four regional states, aided by the US and other Western governments, have found no terror outfit-group connection. Israeli sources lean towards the “lone wolf” track.
  • It has been established that there is a failure in the chain of vetting process: Oman Air flagged him, Oman says flydubai never asked or verified, and the UAE reportedly sent Israel a crew list naming an Omani national on an Israel route.
  • The UAE has not announced the intent or a conclusion on accomplices.
  1. Incident chronology 30 September 2026

Time (30 Sep)

Event

Source

07:05 UAE

FZ1073 (Boeing 737 MAX 8) departs Dubai for Tel Aviv, 174 people on board

Gulf News; Haaretz

~09:28 UAE

Aircraft transmits 7700 near the Saudi-Jordanian border

Gulf News

~09:44

Distress call received by Tabuk controllers

Gulf News

10:45 UAE (09:45 Saudi)

Safe landing at Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Airport, Tabuk

Gulf News

18:40 UAE

Passengers depart on a replacement aircraft

Gulf News (via Tabuk airport statement)

Confirmed, Two reserve pilots aboard took control and landed the aircraft (Al Jazeera).

Furthermore, the names of the two reserve pilots has not been disclosed. Media and passenger reports state that one of the reserve pilots is a British national, while the other is believed to be of European origin.

Al Jazeera also reports a descent of more than 5,180 meters in under two minutes. A passenger, Yaniv Hayoun, whom Netanyahu described as a plumber, was among those who subdued the suspect. Photographs provided after landing reportedly indicate that most of the rudder was missing, attributed to the aircraft exceeding design speed.

Aftermath

  • 1 Oct: both pilots, medically cleared, flown to Abu Dhabi. The suspect Hamam al-Hammami (also spelled Hammam al-Hammami) was transferred from Saudi Arabia to the UAE. The UAE Prosecutor General ordered investigators to investigate the terrorist intent and prior planning or direction (Al Jazeera).
  • 2 Oct: Saudi Ministry of Interior states preliminary findings that the first officer assaulted the captain, injuring both pilots. Netanyahu stated that Israel was investigating the incident and the intent or circumstances surrounding the possible directions if received by the copilot. Additionally he was clear about the Islamist radicalization of Hamami.
  • 3 Oct: UAE Prosecutor General Hamad Saif Al Shamsi has confirmed that the copilot orchestrated the terror attack using the cockpit emergency axe (Times of Israel, citing UAE state media). Additionally, Haaretz reported that the Israeli officials received the crew and passenger list in advance, including the Omani copilot. This also raises questions in regards to what was reported or if there was a lapse in security protocol.
  • 5 Oct: Outlook India, citing regional officials, reports the UAE shared the crew and passenger list, with nationalities, before the flight.
Hamam al-Hammami, the Omani pilot of Flydubai, who attempted to hijack the plane
Hamam al-Hammami, the Omani pilot of Flydubai, who attempted to hijack the plane
  1. The perpetrator
  • Identity: it us confirmed that the attacker was a 29-yr old, Hamam al-Hammami, an Omani national (ABC, AP). CNN and WSJ report he was born in the UAE to an Omani father and a Syrian mother and lived in UAE for several years. WSJ and Al Arabiya indicate the following details about his time there:
  • Security sources estimate that he lived in Syria between 2011 and 2017 (approximately between the ages of 14 and 21). Syria is the home country of his mother.
  • Investigators believe that growing up in a war-torn environment during the height of the Syrian Civil War potentially played a foundational role in his exposure to extremist ideas.
  • While intelligence officials have pinpointed this timeframe as a major area of scrutiny, specific details regarding exactly which cities he resided in or his precise daily activities during those years remain undisclosed. He later left the region to pursue higher education and his aviation career.
  • Accounts from Oman Air Hamami’s LinkedIn profile read by CNN claims that he was with Oman Air for 7 years, ending February 2025. In 2024, while working as a co-pilot trainee, authorities and airline officials discovered extremist materials in Hamami’s possession and found he had been visiting radical Islamic websites. As a result, Omani authorities suspended him from flight training and barred him from flying.
  • Royal Air Maroc stated, that he completed three months of theoretical training in 2025 as part of pre-employment but was not selected. Buckinghamshire New University in UK stated, he completed a distance-learning aviation management course.
  • flydubai tenure: Hired about a year ago per WSJ (via The Week). An Israeli official put his time at about eight months (CNN).
  • CNN analyzed nearly 3,000 deleted tweets from 2021-22 and describes deeply religious, misogynistic views. ABC reported that the archived posts contain no obvious calls for violence against Israel or the West. His X and Instagram accounts were also deleted.
  • Hamami is being held by the UAE and it is reported Hamami indicated his intent to crash the aircraft in Israel (ABC, WSJ).
  • Captain Smit Machchhar said that the copilot had asked to pray minutes before striking him from behind (Al Jazeera, Times of Israel). PM Modi spoke with him and praised his Captain Machchar.
  • According to Times of Israel and Aviation A2Z, the perpetrator told the investigators that he planned to incapacitate the captain, keep the flight normal, obtain landing clearances, and act on final approach to Ben Gurion.
  • Outlook India cites a third source saying he had considered hijacking and crashing another Tel Aviv flight earlier this year, then dropped it. This remains to be verified.

4. Vetting chain and the Israel-route question

  1. Oman to flydubai.

Omani officials say Muscat received no background-check request before his flydubai employment and would have readily shared what it held (Pioneer; NewsBytes). There are no public statements from Oman's government and it is unclear whether Muscat alerted other states or airlines (AP, Times of Israel). Flydubai says it cannot comment beyond its official statements and acknowledges many open questions.

  1. Nationality rule.

NewsBytes reported that on basis of the UAE-Israel aviation arrangement, the crews flying to Israel were limited to UAE nationals or nationals of states with normalized ties to Israel. Israel has no formal relations with Oman (Al Jazeera), and Netanyahu has said such states' nationals are generally not allowed on Israel flights. How an Omani national was rostered is unexplained.

  1. UAE to Israel.

Haaretz reports Israeli officials received the crew and passenger list in advance, including the Omani copilot. Outlook India, citing regional officials, says it included nationalities. If accurate, the Israeli-side review also missed him.

  1. Digital footprint.

Daily Beirut argues his activity ran through pseudonymous or deleted accounts that routine airline vetting seldom reaches. This is commentary, not an investigative finding.

  1. The Al Qaeda question

What is on Known

  1. LinkedIn post. About nine hours after the incident, a profile a source confirmed to CNN as his posted cockpit clips showing El Al and Arkia aircraft, ending on an image of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Ayman al-Zawahiri was an Egyptian terrorist ideologue and trained physician who served as the leader of al-Qaeda from June 2011 until his death in July 2022. The material also referenced Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the Al Qaeda supporter behind the 2009 bombing which killed seven CIA officers and contractors in Afghanistan.
  2. Deleted tweets. CNN says it analyzed thousands of deleted posts from an account linked to him.
  3. Propaganda uptake. Organiser and Breitbart reported that a weekly titled al-Bayan, launched in July by Al Qaeda supporters, praised the attack and urged strikes on aircraft carrying Americans and Israelis.
  4. The Week, summarizing WSJ, says investigators claim he underwent indoctrination into Al Qaeda's ideology and met unspecified religious figures. No names, groups or dates have been published. CNN has highlighted two videos going to Instagram and LinkedIn in quick succession about nine hours after the incident, and both accounts have since been deleted.

The Al Qaeda imagery in hand dates from the attack day. The 2021-22 archive CNN and ABC indicates the religious and misogynistic content but no such material, so the timeline of when the radicalization turned violent in case of Hamami is yet to be determined.

What is not yet Certain

  • More evidence in regards to any membership, tasking, funding, training or communication with Al Qaeda or its affiliates with Hamami yet to be disclosed. A Gulf diplomat told AP that agencies from four regional countries, aided by the US and other Western governments, have found no terror-group link, suggesting he probably acted alone. Outlook India and Breitbart (citing investigators) say the same.
  • Israeli sources told CNN the inquiry points to a lone actor and Israel knows of no group or state link. Netanyahu says Israel is still examining whether anyone directed him.
  • Donald Trump suggested a possible Iran link "based on what I'm hearing," with no detail. Yet to find the corroboration.
  • The identity of the Al Qaeda-linked "religious figures" in the WSJ-sourced claim, and whether they were in contact with him is also yet to be determined.

Analysis based on the available information

  • It can be inferred that Zawahiri and al-Balawi are tailored symbols, indicating ideological alignment, consistent with online self-radicalization, and are equally consistent with a lone actor borrowing Al Qaeda iconography. This type of pattern is well associated with the post-2022 landscape, after Zawahiri's killing, in which the brand circulates through backed media rather than command structures.
  • Al Qaeda supporting outlets claiming or celebrating an attack after the fact is standard opportunism and is weak evidence of prior coordination. The al-Bayan claim also rests on partisan secondary outlets.
  • The LinkedIn content appeared after he was reportedly already in custody. There is no explanation regarding who controlled the account or whether the post was scheduled. This poses as a very the significant question for the Al Qaeda link. While a scheduled post would mean premeditation, while third-party access would imply an associate. Neither is established.

Why Hamami might have used an Al Qaeda frame

  • Target choice: His posted clips displayed Israeli carriers' aircraft and the flight bound for Tel Aviv. That points to an anti-Israel grievance first, with Al Qaeda supplying the vocabulary.
  • Zawahiri has become infamously known for the utilization of an aircraft as a weapon for 9/11 attack. Additionally, the imagery of Al-Balawi, the 2009 Khost bomber, killed seven CIA officers and contractors after being trusted inside a secure perimeter. If the pairing is intentional, then it glorifies Hamami in terror circuit as the insider who turned a trusted position into a jihadist attack.
  • Since Zawahiri's death in 2022, Al Qaeda's imagery circulates largely through supporter media. A self-radicalized person can adopt it with no contact. WSJ-sourced reports say he was indoctrinated into the ideology, but no group or person has been named.
  • Reported time in Syria and exposure to radical circles (AP's regional official, Al Arabiya) may matter, but nothing public confirms it and much is yet to be disclosed or made public.

Why Al Qaeda would want the publicity, if it has any role

  • The FZ1073 foiled attack ties back to 9/11 and later plots such as the 2009 underwear bomb and the 2010 printer-cartridge bombs.
  • A mass-casualty attack on a UAE-Israel route would hit Israeli citizens and also embarrass the Abraham Accords partners while undermining and exposing vulnerabilities in UAE security.
  • Dramatic attacks help Al Qaeda's brand against ISIS and offset the loss of its leadership.
  • A pilot in the cockpit is the hardest route to stop, consistent with the alleged plan to strike on final approach.
  • Al Qaeda has predominantly focused on the US and the West, and its operational record against Israel is thin. Hence this would add another feather in their hat of terror achievements.
  • The al-Bayan praise is retrospective and comes from supporters, so it is weak evidence of direction but the potential and possibility of al Qaeda connection remains open until further reports of investigation.
  • At the moment, based on reports lone, ideologically driven individual using Al Qaeda iconography. Investigators have found no organizational link so far.
  1. Regional Cooperation and investigation
  • UAE judicial investigation under the Prosecutor General, who ordered inquiry into terrorist intent and prior planning or direction.
  • Israel and Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Interior. A Gulf diplomat told AP that agencies from four regional states are working on motive, aided by the US and other Western governments (states not named).
  • Omani officials state that they are now sharing their security flags in an active counterterrorism investigation (NewsBytes; single aggregator).
  • Netanyahu has stated that Israel is investigating whether the copilot acted under direction, and warns any accomplice would pay a heavy price (Al Jazeera).
  • UAE has not publicly announced a motive or whether he acted alone

 

Contested claims

Issue

Version A

Version B

Note

Oman Air history

LinkedIn profile (via CNN): seven years, left Feb 2025

WSJ and ABC: co-pilot trainee in 2024, extremist material found 2024

Profile is self-reported; not reconciled

Date of removal

Removed "last year" (CNN sources)

2024 finding (ABC)

Could be one process spanning two years

Oman's action

Removed from training, moved to admin role (AP, ABC, CNN)

"Permanent aviation ban" (NewsBytes)

Ban claim is single aggregator

Flydubai hire

About a year ago (WSJ via The Week)

About eight months (Israeli official via CNN)

Unreconciled

Nationality

Omani through his father (AP regional official)

Possible dual citizenship (NewsBytes, Omani sources)

Dual citizenship unverified

Squawk code

7700 general emergency (Gulf News)

Hijack code (Wikipedia)

Unresolved

Restraint timing

About 09:35 (Aviation A2Z)

Distress call 09:44 (Gulf News)

Timezones and sources may differ

Intent

Crash in Israel (ABC, WSJ)

Act on final approach (Times of Israel via Aviation A2Z)

Compatible; second is single-sourced

Earlier plans or flights

Considered hijacking another Tel Aviv flight earlier this year (Outlook India, third source)

Had flown to Israel before (Times of Israel-linked item)

Neither corroborated

Al Qaeda tie

Indoctrinated into its ideology (WSJ via The Week)

No militant-group link found (Gulf diplomat to AP)

Ideology versus organisation; both can hold

Official-version scrutiny

Online commentators question aspects (Al Jazeera)

No substantiated alternative reported

Noise unless substantiated

It is imperative to mention, since its an ongoing investigation, the analysis is limited to recent findings and disclosed reports.

 

 

More on the Flydubai hijacking case:

Regional Responses to FZ1073: Cooperation Amid Diplomatic Tension: https://www.thestrategicperspective.org/regional-responses-to-fz1073-cooperation-amid-diplomatic-tension/

About the author

Aparna Rawal

Aparna Rawal is a strategic affairs and security analyst with over a decade of experience in defence, counterterrorism, and regional power dynamics across South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. She serves as Editor-in-Chief of The Strategic Perspective and is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi, India, where she contributes to research on Indian strategic affairs and geopolitical developments. She previously led Voice of Baloch as Editor-in-Chief.

Her work has appeared in Indian Military Review, Indian Defence Review, South Asia Monitor and The Eurasian Times. She holds a Master's in International Relations and Diplomacy (specialization in Anti-Terrorism) from Annamalai University, India, a Diploma in Labour Law with Indian Administrative Law, also from Annamalai University, India, and a Bachelor of Arts in Media Study from SUNY Buffalo, U.S.

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