FZ1073: India Opens a Case, Israel Tightens the Rules

Assessment in brief

• The lone-actor case has hardened, but not shut down

The UAE Attorney-General has stated that on 9 October, the suspected copilot Hamam al-Hammami confessed, in presence of his lawyer, to having planned the suicide attack on Ben Gurion Airport's passenger terminal while acting alone. Prosecutors have stated the “alone" claim is still expected to be subjected to additional investigation. No Al Qaeda link appears in the findings as reported, however one cannot disregard the possibility and the confirmed affinity, even though the association is yet to be further established.

• The plot was long-range infiltration, not late radicalization.

Prosecutors have been able to identify Hamami’s drift to extremism to 2017 and have said that he flew to Tel Aviv twice beforehand. Hebrew media, relaying his interrogation, reported that he chose flydubai because it served Tel Aviv and planned the attack before he was hired.

• India joins.

The NIA registered a case on 9 October under the Anti-Hijacking Act and the UAPA. It has requested government approval to deploy a team to the UAE. Access to the suspect depends on Abu Dhabi, which has reportedly resisted even Israeli demands for full participation.

• Israel's crew rule is old, however its enforcement is new.

Airlines are now "exclusively responsible" for keeping crew who hold, or co-hold, the nationality of states without relations with Israel off Israel-bound flights. Air France, United and Smartwings have reportedly complied. An Ethiopian Airlines cargo flight was turned back on 11-12 October over an Indonesian pilot.

• The Israel-UAE aviation reset has stalled.

Reports on 13-14 October mention, Israel wants Shin Bet personnel and scanners at Dubai airports, the UAE has refused, and flydubai has extended its suspension through the end of October after Israel refused its request to resume.

What has changed since 5 October

Below are the latest developments.

The UAE's 9 October findings

The timeline problem.

It was earlier reported that security sources placing Hamami in Syria from 2011 to 2017.

The newer record points elsewhere: the Telegraph has him at RMIT in Melbourne from 2015 to 2017, at L3 Airline Academy in England in 2018-19 (with a New Zealand student visa from November 2018 to May 2019), and in a distance-learning course at Buckinghamshire New University from 2020 to 2023. The UAE dates his transition toward extremism to 2017 in Australia. Syria could at most cover 2011-2015.

The Melbourne claim.

The Australian reports that he told investigators he was linked to MyCentre in Broadmeadows. Its founder, Samir Mohtadi, claims he has never met him, and the center bears no record of him attending.

The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils rejected any link to violent extremism. Australian Associated Press reports that the UAE statement also suggested Mohtadi received support from a Muslim Brotherhood-linked association, and that the Australian Federal Police have confirmed a Victorian counter-terrorism team is investigating his domestic links. The UAE has designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organization since 2014.

Assessment for now

Based on the recent reported findings, the perpetrator does not present ties to Al Qaeda or any group. Channel 12, relayed by Israel National News, reports that he linked the attack to the Gaza war and told investigators he wanted to die a martyr.

If the report is accurate, the stated grievance is anti-Israel rather than organizational. The picture is a long-horizon, self-directed insider plot built on a 9/11 template, which supports the lone-wolf theory.

However, the possibility of other associations cannot be discredited if the confession is self-reported and additionally the devices and flight recordings are still under examination.

Ynet's single-sourced report that Abu Dhabi will seek the death penalty suggests prosecutors want a clean, individual-culpability case.

India's NIA case

The NIA's 9 October FIR gives India a formal seat on the file, but how it pans out depends on Abu Dhabi, which holds primary jurisdiction.

What was registered. The Home Ministry directed the NIA to take the case under Section 6 read with Section 8 of the NIA Act. The FIR text quoted by ANI cites Section 3 of the Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016 and Section 16 read with Section 15(1)(a) of the UAPA and describes an "apparent attempt to hijack or crash" the aircraft. IANS, citing NIA sources, and the Daily Pioneer add UAPA Sections 18 and 20 (conspiracy and membership of a terrorist organisation) and say the probe covers "possible lone-wolf terror motives and radicalization networks". The full FIR has not been published. Jurisdiction rests on the victim being an Indian national and the offences being scheduled under the NIA Act, even though the attack happened outside India.

What it plans to do.

NIA will seek government approval to send a team to the UAE to record Captain Smit Machchhar's statement, meet Emirati investigators and obtain their findings, and possibly seek access to Hammami. The Pioneer adds that it intends to request the cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder and the suspect's devices through Saudi Arabia and the UAE. One correction to the framing in circulation: the reports describe a statement-and-liaison mission with access to the suspect as something the NIA "may seek". None describes a forensic team joining interrogations, and as of 15 October neither Delhi's approval nor Abu Dhabi's consent has been reported.

Assessment.

• Broad sections are not evidence of a network. Invoking conspiracy and membership provisions against a suspect who confessed to acting alone is consistent with standard practice of registering wide to preserve investigative scope. No report alleges any Indian nexus or any link beyond the cockpit.
• Expect narrow access. The UAE asserted jurisdiction on 1 October because the aircraft is UAE-registered. Channel 12 reports it has since refused Israel full participation and will withhold details of its probe. India's realistic asks are the captain's statement, a UAE briefing and documents. A direct interview of the suspect would need Emirati consent through legal-assistance channels and is the least likely outcome.
• Delhi's tone will stay cooperative. India's ties with both the UAE and Israel are close, and MEA messaging so far has centered on Machchhar's welfare and contact with local authorities. An NIA line implying that Emirati findings are incomplete would carry a diplomatic cost that Delhi has no evident reason to pay.
• The domestic stake is reputational. IANS reports that Prime Minister Modi told Machchhar his conduct protected the standing of Indian pilots, at a time when the Air India AI171 investigation also remained in the news. That framing is consistent with prioritizing a visible case.

Israel's crew-nationality restrictions

Scope, as reported. N12 says the Ministry of Transport and Road Safety notified foreign airlines on 1 October (one outlet gives 7 October). Operators must ensure that no pilot or cabin crew member on a flight inbound Israel's flight information region holds citizenship, including dual citizenship, of a state without diplomatic relations with Israel. Kan quotes the directive as making the airline "exclusively responsible". Crew holding only such a nationality were always barred, and Israel had largely relied on airlines to supervise this. The new element is the extension to dual nationals.

The country count is unsettled: 29 in a reported United memo, 31 in Mediapart and Israeli media, 32 in one aggregator. The 29-country list attributed to Walla and a reported United memo names Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Cuba, Djibouti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela and Yemen.

Haaretz's summary of Mediapart says its 31 adds Nicaragua and Colombia to the 29. The Times of Israel reported on 14 October that Colombia had opened an embassy in Jerusalem, so either the list is stale or the reporting may be wrong. No official list has been published to be reported.

Assessment.

• The rule would have stopped him. Hammami was Omani and Oman appears on every reported list. The failure was verification and liability, not rule design. Ynet reports that for FZ1073 the Transport Ministry never received a crew list and that flydubai had assured Israel its rostering system blocked such crew. The Ethiopian turnaround shows detection works, but only if the manifest arrives before departure of the flight.
• A nationality filter is both too wide and too narrow. On the UAE's account Hamami’s radicalization started through Australia, with flight training in Britain and New Zealand. A pilot on the same path holding a passport from a recognized state would pass. Meanwhile dual-national French, Pakistani or Bangladeshi crew with no such history are grounded.
• Legal friction is building in Europe. Middle East Eye says enforcement could expose Air France to challenge in France, and La France insoumise deputy Thomas Portes and MEP Rima Hassan have attacked the carrier publicly. Air France's line is that rules of the destination bind it. No court filing had been reported by 15 October, and no official reaction from Islamabad, Dhaka or Jakarta surfaced in the coverage reviewed.
• A competing narrative exists and is unsupported. Iranian outlet Kayhan calls the incident a "fabrication" and the rules a Netanyahu ploy ahead of the 27 October election, citing an unnamed UAE-linked source in Yedioth Ahronoth. That account is contradicted by the UAE's medical-forensic finding of axe-consistent head injuries and by the Saudi Interior Ministry's statement that the first officer assaulted the captain.

The Israel-UAE standoff

Within nine days the aviation relationship transitioned from reported settlement to open dispute, and the immediate flashpoint is whether Israeli security personnel may operate on Emirati soil.

How it unfolded.

Israeli carriers have been barred from UAE routes by the Shin Bet since the beginning of the Iran war in late February, and El Al, Israir and Arkia had lobbied for months to return. After FZ1073, Transport Minister Miri Regev has pushed to suspend flydubai, and Israel agreed a six-day suspension in coordination with President Mohamed bin Zayed (Calcalist). According to reports Netanyahu spoke to him the same evening, the Shin Bet allowed Israeli carriers temporary flights on leased aircraft. Haaretz reported on 5 October that the dispute over baggage scanners was resolved.

Where it stands.

On 13-14 October, Channel 12 reported that Israel is demanding better screening machinery and Shin Bet agents on the ground at Dubai airport. The Emirati officials reject this ("You're hurting our honor"). Globes, via Middle East Monitor, said that Israel wants to station security personnel on Emirati territory, as it does in several other states, and to run baggage checkpoints. The planned Israeli delegation was postponed or cancelled because, Israeli sources said, the UAE had not offered the guarantees sought. In response the UAE reportedly said it would withhold the details of its full investigation, and Israeli sources said they would not act as a "rubber stamp" and expect full participation in the probe. Flydubai is suspended at least through 31 October. Etihad's six daily Abu Dhabi flights are the only direct route, and Israeli carriers' announced restarts (Arkia 31 October, Israir 18 November, El Al in November) predate the dispute and now look at risk.

Update, 15 October.

Calcalist reports that flydubai did not resume flights on 15 October as planned and the suspension has extended through the end of the month. It reported that the airline completed an internal inquiry and identified the security lapses.

Channel 13, relayed by The Week on 7 October, said it had dismissed several employees. The inquiry's findings were not published in the sources reviewed.

Transport Minister Regev and the Civil Aviation Authority refused to let it resume, arguing it knowingly and flagrantly breached the aviation agreement. Because the carrier is partly state-owned, the ministry treats the matter as a dispute between states and is withholding approval until it has comprehensive information about the incident. That is the information the UAE is reported to be withholding, so each side's precondition is the other's concession. The UAE's civil aviation authority says 37 flights carried 7,479 passengers from Dubai to Ben Gurion between 2 and 5 October, on Etihad and Israeli carriers with Emirati permits.

The UAE took 8.3 per cent of Ben Gurion's passengers in 2025. Over the first eight months of 2026, 837,000 Ben Gurion passengers flew to the UAE even without Israeli carriers, half of them on flydubai (Reuters). The Shin Bet reportedly warned that suspending flydubai could strain Abraham Accords ties.

Israel's own institutional gap.

The Jerusalem Post and The Media Line report that a 2024 State Comptroller report urged a comprehensive review of civil aviation security, including foreign aircraft entering Israeli airspace. The security cabinet then ordered an interagency review coordinated by the National Security Council, but agencies disputed who should vet foreign airlines and the Transport Ministry kept the role. A 2023 law created a National Center for Passenger Data Analysis; whether it screened FZ1073's crew has not been established. Former Shin Bet aviation-security official Mena Bacharach proposes remotely activated cockpit cameras that switch on after a distress signal, and he and other experts warn that nationality is an insufficient risk measure. The proposals carry privacy, reliability and cyber-security trade-offs.

More on the Flydubai case:

FZ1073: The Perpetrator, the Al-Qaeda Links Investigated: https://www.thestrategicperspective.org/fz1073-the-perpetrator-the-al-qaeda-links-investigated/

Regional Responses to FZ1073: Cooperation Amid Diplomatic Tension: https://www.thestrategicperspective.org/regional-responses-to-fz1073-cooperation-amid-diplomatic-tension/