This is the second part of the article, the first one can be read here.
It is impossible to state with certainty that Israel will take this step. However, the situation is such that makes this step possible and the eventual repercussions, which would have been substantial in the past, are not present. The pushback from the international community would be limited, at best. For 433 days since the invasion of the Hamas brigades in Israel under the shameful cheering of large portions of the United Nations, the situation looks like:
A) Hamas in Gaza is nearly neutralized, the majority of its leaders are eliminated and their forces are greatly demoralized.
B) Hezbollah, the much bigger and better funded organization coming from Lebanon had nearly all of its leaders taken out. The chances of revival after the fall of the Assad regime have diminished greatly, but until some government is formed it is unclear whether those will be completely severed, or the old channels will be revived. Considering the background of the leader of HTS, Ahmed al-Sharaa, aka Abu Muhammad al-Juliani, a former Al Qaeda operative, who had formed Al-Nusra Front and is responsible as a leader for a big list of bombings and massacres (2012 al-Midan bombing – 26 killed, 60 injured; 2012 Damascus bombing – 55 killed, 400 injured; 2013 Damascus bombing – 83 killed; 2014 Homs school bombing – 54 people of whom 47 kids; Hatla massacre – 30 to 60 killed; Qalb Loze massacre – at least 20 killed; Zara’a attack – 42 children and 7 militia men killed; 2017 Damascus bombings – 114 killed, 150+ injured; 2017 Aleppo car bombing – 126+ killed, 55+ injured). The current claims are for him to have turned into a reformist Islamist leader allowing various ethnic and religious groups to coexist. His previous extremist behavior is sometimes explained as the means to seize control. Considering the track record, however, waiting to confirm this would be rather immature from Israel.
C) Syria has been effectively dismantled in terms of military power and infrastructure.
D) Iran launched about 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on 1 October 2024 under what they called Operation True Promise 2. It was largely unsuccessful as the waves of the missiles managed to kill 2 people from debris and cause total damage of $40 to $50 million. Israel, however, responded on 26 October 2024 when over 100 fighter jets crossed over to Iran hitting radar, air defense and ballistic missiles sites. The attack, codenamed Operation Days of Repentance, was extremely important, as it destroyed most of Iran’s air defense network and nearly all of its S-300 systems (the Russian long range surface-to-air missile systems). This, according to estimates, would take at least a year to rebuild if all deliveries and construction happen to plan. The lack of the defense system in that period could make future strikes significantly more possible.
Comparing Israel and Iran in terms of planning is also interesting. While Iran tends to respond nearly immediately, Israel took its own time from 1 October to 26 October. It was a longer wait of 3.5 weeks and for that time the Israeli pilots should have learned every inch of the 1,000+ kilometers to the border with Iran. It is likely, thought, that the leadership of the country designed a strategic plan where the chain of events could lead to the current situation – Syrian regime destroyed, Russia removed from the region, Turkey and Saudi Arabia silent and most importantly US approving if they do not have to intervene on ground. It is a theoretical possibility, which could be explored and if such events took place, they would know how good the Iranian defense is from the results of Operation Days of Repentance.


The US perspective
Considering the election rhetoric by President-elect Donald Trump that US should leave some of the zones of conflict and his post on X from 7 December 2024 pointing out that the Syrian conflict is not a US fight and they should not have anything to do with it would definitely indicate that a direct involvement would perhaps cause more problems at home than solve existing problems. There are 3 very positive outcomes, however, if successful strikes topple the government in Tehran:
A) The long-lasting problem with the nuclear sites will be eliminated and decades of research, building infrastructure and know-how will be reset, thus eliminating the emergence of a major decision maker in this volatile region. The Wall Street Journal reported that sources within the Trump team have indicated that the team is evaluating possible preemptive strikes as diplomacy might not be an instrument which could be used with the Islamic Republic’s leadership.
B) The problem with the sale of oil to countries which the US does not favor, will cease to exist, at least for the short to mid term. This will help bring greater predictability to the oil markets, which would be very important to avoid recession as many economists are pointing out that this is an increased possibility.
C) The support for the Houthis in Yemen will be eliminated. This will decrease significantly the problems associated with the marine traffic in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as this is a major choke point for international commercial traffic, specifically that between consuming Europe and producing Asia. Without the support of Iran, the militias will likely not be able to conduct aggressive operations against civilian ships or send rockets or drones over 1,000+km targeting residential areas.
Considering the above, the US might not be involved directly but may turn a blind eye to a possible Israeli attack on Iran as such action would solve major problems in their international policy without the political risk of involving American soldiers. Or it can help with strikes and air support to avoid ground conflict.
The Saudi Arabia perspective
Saudi Arabia and Iran have been divided on a number of issues. The most obvious one is along the line of the Shia-Sunni divide. The more practical one is the behavior stemming from their membership in OPEC. Since OPEC is a cartel, it also suffers from problems associated to cartel structures – the big players set the rules for production quantity and prices that will benefit everybody in the long run, while the smaller players have the incentive to cheat on those agreements. Big changes in their production would affect greatly their revenues without significantly affecting the overall cartel’s production thus making it hard to detect and penalize.
Geopolitically, while Saudi Arabia has been more aligned with the US-UK area of economic influence, Iran has been leaning towards the USSR and Russia. The tensions between both countries have escalated so much so that in 2016 Riadh suspended diplomatic ties with Tehran and they were renewed under the push by China in March 2023.
Iran’s involvement in Yemen with the Houthis, which Saudi Arabia opposes, is another point of clash. Weaker Iran would solve this and a number of other problems. It could make significantly more possible the establishment of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, where Saudi Arabia is planning on playing a central role.
An even more important role in the mid-term for Saudi Arabia is peace with Israel. While friendship with Iran has proven that they lose money through Teheran’s cheating on OPEC conditions, normalization of ties with Israel could mean connection to the oil and gas transportation network and its further development to serve more deliveries to Europe of Saudi resources and transportation of Caspian oil and gas to China and South Korea. Because of this, Saudi Arabia officially condemned Israel for its actions in Gaza and Lebanon, but it was an extremely mild response and was essentially a statement that a peaceful solution must be found, followed by no further actions.
The Turkish Perspective
Turkey was the main moving force behind the rebellion against Assad, so they would naturally be against anybody attempting to reinstate the regime. Even if they have been critical of Israel throughout the backlash after the 7 October Hamas invasion, they have achieved higher strategic objectives through the fall of the regime. One of the main reasons is that the problem with the Kurds becomes significantly smaller.
Turkey has been increasingly playing a bigger role in the distribution of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Russia. The decrease of the influence of Iran can only bring positives to Turkey and fund its budget. Because of this, a strike on Iran will likely be condemned, perhaps the ambassador will be called in for an explanation, but further action would be less likely.
The Azerbaijan Perspective
Similar to Turkey, Azerbaijan shares many of the incentives that Turkey has and is likely to play a passive role. The country will directly benefit if the oil and gas infrastructure connecting Saudi Arabia with Israel gets developed, thus giving them access to greater capacity for the Asian markets.
The Russian Perspective
Russia was an ally of the Assad regime and they provided shelter to him and his family. They managed to negotiate security for now for their assets in Syria (the naval and air bases in Tartus and Latakia) but satellite imagery over the last 2 days from Maxar Technologies. It is currently not clear if the agreement is to remain there or to allow them to leave in a peaceful fashion. Russia’s focus is obviously on the conflict in Ukraine and they are likely to concentrate their effort there before it is clear what the new form of government in Syria will be. As such, their influence in the region has dropped significantly and considering the differences they had with the Iranian leadership, it is less likely to establish strong presence.

Historically, Russia has waited for such allies to be in a situation with less options so that they could intervene and reap benefits further from such assistance. This, however, is possible in cases of invasion. If Israel strikes Iran and manages to destroy most priority targets within a short timeframe, Russia would not be able to position itself as a defender. Alternatively, Moscow can wait for a destruction of nuclear and military sites and intervene if they are offered to supply the military equipment and power generation equipment for new powerplants if necessary. This would play well for everybody as it would take several years even in best case scenarios.
The Chinese Perspective
China has increased the cooperation with Iran over the last years in their attempt to expand the Belt and Road Initiative. Other than issuing a statement about the need to pursue peace, Beijing, has been more or less silent with regards to the developments in the Middle East. They, however, been very active around Taiwan concluding series of drills, which international analysts described as scare tactics. It is possible that they are used to judge reactions by Taiwan or see the effect of such actions on the Taiwanese economy. Should the Middle East conflict escalate further, the US would spread thin waging 2 proxy wars – in Ukraine and in the Middle East – and the attention to South China Sea and East China Sea will diminish. The extensive war games, which the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) organized in January 2023 under the guidance of very senior US military officials showed that the US is likely to win a possible onslaught on Taiwan but at a very heavy price. It is unclear how this will develop if US presence in the area is decreased.
Israel is facing a historic opportunity to reshape the Middle East. If they choose to strike weakened Iran in a situation, where the Islamic Republic is not likely to get significant support, they can achieve decades long objectives, the chance for which have never been present in the last 45 years.